

Supply Chain Standards

Cybersecurity and Digitalization: Supply Chain Risks in the Electricity Sector

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Agenda: Supply Chain Standards for Electric Power Utilities

- Focus on Electric Power Utility supply chain issues in the operational environment
- Cover internationally accepted standards and guidelines relevant to identifying and managing cybersecurity risks associated with the supply chain risk from third-parties / suppliers and will provide a survey of these documents (e.g., the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST] Cybersecurity Framework, NIST SP800-161, ISO/IEC 27036-1:2021, NISTIR 8276).
- Address different approaches and considerations that utilities should take into account based on their context (e.g., generation, transmission, distribution, DER aggregators).

Overview of Cyber Security Standards and Guidelines

The key IEC, ISO, IEEE, NIST, NERC, and IETF cyber security standards and best practices are shown in the diagram, organized by type (What, How, Process towards Compliance) and by Focus Area (High general level, High energy-specific level, Detailed technical level).



Elements of Cybersecurity: Organization, Procedures, and Technologies, based on Risk Assessment



What is Unique about Supply Chain Standards?

- Most cybersecurity standards focus on what **a single organization** needs to do to secure their own people, systems, and operations.
- Supply Chain security issues, by definition, involve **multiple** organizations
 - Procurement of products from other organizations.
 - Utilization of external communication networks and services, such as markets and cloud services.
 - Interactions with personnel from other organizations: vendors, plant operators, aggregators, and customers.
 - Incorporation of equipment from other organizations into power system operations, such as generating plants and distributed energy resources.



What are the Supply Chain Risks?

- Utility purchases energy management products from vendors who have deliberately or accidentally incorporated malicious code into their systems.
- Utility interfaces to 3rd party products which contain malicious code.
- Utility develops software using code from compromised sources.
- Utility installs 2 software/firmware patches with malicious code that is undetected: only detectable with both patches applied.
- 3rd parties connect to utility operations without adequate access control, authentication, or authorization.
- Supplier cannot provide products to utility in a timely manner due to their supply chain problems.
- Supplier provides lower quality or even counterfeit products due to their supply chain problems.
- Natural disasters physically disrupt the development and/or delivery of products.
- Regulatory changes affect delivery of systems timing and/or quality.
- Cloud services experience cyber attacks, impacting sensitive data and power system operations.

Malicious code impacts:

- Allows sensitive information to be stolen.
- Affects power system operations, causing power outages, frequency or voltage problems, equipment failures, or even safety issues.
- Affects power markets so that subtle changes allow one market participant to gain more than the rules permit.
- Affects customer's appliances, causing utility loss of reputation even if they pay for damaged appliances.



What are the Supply Chain Vulnerabilities?

- Utility fails to have comprehensive Security Policies for their OT systems (ISO/IEC 27019, IEC 62443, NIST CSF, NERC CIPs, etc.)
- Utility fails to have a supply chain policy for their procurements
- Utility fails to check on their vendors' supply chain policies
- Utility fails to test vendor products for common malware
- Utility fails to request the vendor to validate software systems and patches
- Utility fails to test the cybersecurity of vendor products including interfaces with utility equipment
- Utility fails to have multiple vendors able to supply similar products
- Utility fails to use multifactor authentication for access to critical systems
- Utility fails to require 3rd party owners and operators of generating plants and distributed energy resources (DER) to implement cybersecurity before connecting to the power system
- Utility fails to have cybersecurity contractual agreements on responsibilities and actions with 3rd party aggregators and DER owner/operators
- Utility fails to have plans for operations during natural disasters and recovering after such events



What are Some Key Actions to Address these Supply Chain Vulnerabilities?

- Risk Assessment (see later slides)
- Use of power system monitoring to detect and log possible cyber attacks
- Cybersecurity requirements and testing certification for all interconnecting systems and personnel
- Cross-organizational contractual agreements on responsibilities and actions of all parties
- Role-Based Access Control (IEC 62351-8) for all external parties
- Gateways with strong security (next slide)



Example: Role-Based Access Control

What are Some Key Actions to Address these Supply Chain Vulnerabilities?

• Example DER architecture with gateways



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NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (draft)

- **GOVERN** (**GV**) Establish and monitor the organization's cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy.
- *IDENTIFY (ID) Help determine the current cybersecurity risk to the organization.*
- **PROTECT** (**PR**) Use safeguards to prevent or reduce cybersecurity risk.
- **DETECT** (**DE**) Find and analyze possible cybersecurity attacks and compromises.
- **RESPOND** (**RS**) Take action regarding a detected cybersecurity incident.
- **RECOVER** (**RC**) Restore assets and operations that were impacted by a cybersecurity incident.

Function	Category	Category Identifier
Govern (GV)	Organizational Context	GV.OC
	Risk Management Strategy	GV.RM
	Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management	GV.SC
	Roles, responsibilities, and Authorities	GV.RR
	Policies, Processes, and Procedures	GV.PO
	Oversight	GV.OV
Identify (ID)	Asset Management	ID.AM
	Risk Assessment	ID.RA
	Improvement	ID.IM
Protect (PR)	Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control	PR.AA
	Awareness and Training	PR.AT
	Data Security	PR.DS
	Platform Security	PR.PS
	Technology Infrastructure Resilience	PR.IR
Detect (DE)	Continuous Monitoring	DE.CM
	Adverse Event Analysis	DE.AE
Respond (RS)	Incident Management	RS.MA
	Incident Analysis	RS.AN
	Incident Response Reporting and Communication	RS.CO
	Incident Mitigation	RS.MI
Recover (RC)	Incident Recovery Plan Execution	RC.RP
	Incident Recovery Communication	RC.CO

Standards on Third-Party Risk Management and Cyber Risk Assessment Methodologies Gian Luigi Pugni









Topics

- Risk assessment for Energy Systems with the goal of Business Continuity
- Adoption of company policy and guidelines in Supply Chain management: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM)

NIST 2.0 Framework draft perspective

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	Incident Mitigation	RS.MI	
Recover (RC)	Incident Recovery Plan Execution	RC.RP	1
	Incident Recovery Communication	RC.CO	1

Source: Public Draft: The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 – NIST - August 8, 2023 <u>https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/cswp/29/the-nist-cybersecurity-framework-20/ipd</u>

ber abl gan	r supply chain risk management processes are identified, lished, managed, monitored, and improved by izational stakeholders (formerly ID.SC)				
	GV.SC-01: A cybersecurity supply chain risk management program, strategy, objectives, policies, and processes are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders (formerly ID.SC-01)				
	GV.SC-02: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally (formerly ID.AM-06)				
	GV.SC-03: Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management, risk assessment, and improvement processes (formerly 1D.SC 02)				
	GV.SC-04: Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality				
GV.SC-05: Requirements to address cybereceatity tida, in capply chains are established, prioritic integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third part (formerly ID.SC-03)					
	GV.SC-06: Planning and due diligence are performed to reduce risks before entering into formal supplier of other third-party relationships				
	GV.SC-07: The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are identified, recorded, prioritized, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship (formerly ID.SC-02, ID.SC-04)				
	GV.SC-08: Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities (formerry ID.SC-05)				
	GV.SC-09: Supply chain security practices are integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management programs, and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle				
	CV SC 10. Cybersequeity supply shein risk management plans include provisions for activities that accur				

Enterprise supply chain



Source: NIST SP 800-161r1

Enterprise supply chain

The Supply Chain is a set of complex, globally distributed and interconnected resources and processes.

Cyber SCRM is the set of activities necessary to manage the Cyber Security risk associated with external parties.

This is needed to:

- **Determine** Cyber Security Requirements for Suppliers
- Implement requirements through formal agreements (e.g. contracts)
- Communicate to suppliers how these requirements will be verified and validated
- Verify that cybersecurity requirements are met through a variety of assessment methodologies
- Maintain and improve continuously this process as part of cyber security process Source: NIST SP 800-161r1

Governance Risk & Compliance management



Policy and Guidelines – concept and examples



Policy and Guidelines – concept and examples

Context requirements and technical specifications will feed the afterward supply chain processes and can incorporate controls from requirement standards (e.g., IEC 62443) or technical standard (e.g., IEC 62351).

Each control responsibility should be clearly assigned to specific actors of the supply chain (client, integrator, manufacturer, service provider)

Specifications on

context requirements

Specific context technical

specifications & guidelines

It must be defined and well communicated Who is responsible of issuing, maintenance and deployment

s Man s Coni

These are "the rules of the game" that must be valid for the whole supply chain (both for suppliers or clients)

Policy and guidelines are guided by: Regulatory requirements Standard and best practices yet must reflect the company reality

laaS cloud security requirements

Cortification Authority CP and CPS

ents

on and

Must be shared, agreed and adopted in the product/service procurement phase and in internal solution development

AD architecture structure
 procedures

Authentication requireme

Data protection and encr

Physical monitoring for S PKI Systems requirement

Monitoring of OT network

- IEC 62351 implementation
- Monitoring of OT networl

Represent the basis for certification and Audit processes

C-SCRM Lifecycle – Agree with suppliers on...

Manufacturer/provider Qualification	Purchase (tender) for product/service	Development and deployment of the solution	Maintenance	Decommissioning
 Certifications Competences and contribution on Cybersecurity standards and best practices Better to share at this stage policy and guidelines Share the expected standard compliance (e.g. IEC 62443, ISO 27K) 	 Risk assessment Technical standard periodical Audit clause HR requirement Vulnerability and event notification Lifecycle clauses (patching, maintenance, decommissioning) SLA with attention to Business Continuity Info sharing agreement 	 Security by design, standard based development or integration Vulnerability Assessment on development and pre deployment At this stage Policy, and technical specification based on standard (e.g IEC 62351) must be commonly adopted 	 Business Continuity process regular testing Patching / maintenance process Regular Audit on product / systems and services Monitoring of events -> incident detection Asset management CERT/CSIRT process with asset responsibility 	 Secure Information back transfer Cleanup of devices and supplier data base

Risk management ISO 31000 process and supply chain

Communication ad consultation



Enterprise Policies must consider Business process relationship with supplier, customers and all stakeholders

Since vendor qualification stage the context will enrich

For every new product, system, service the contex will change

New Business processes will change the scope

At this stage the reference contacts for afterwards steps must be agreed

Risk management ISO 31000 process and supply chain



ISO 31010 provides several example metodologies for Risk Identification, Analysis and Evaluation. NIST SP 800-161r1 provides specific practices for C-SCRM

Questionaire, interviews but also statistical information. Best should be using common and standard tools. Perceived Risk is normaly unreliable.

Data from monitoring and Review subprocess are essential, but also a tools and metodologies to collect them (inside company and from supplier).

Information Sharing with all sector stakeholders, and authorities is important

Risk management ISO 31000 process and supply chain

Communication ad consultation



Risk Assessments results may require to be: Avoid, Transfer, Mitigate or Accept every specific Risk.

In a multilevel SC Risk Transfer is needed and must me specified in the contract agreement: Policy and Technical specification must be clear in defining roles between parties (e.g. CERT relationships).

Requirement and Technical standard are fundamental to build Company technical specifications

Product, maintenance and Service supply require quite different approach.

C-SCRM additional elements

Regulatory compliance requirements: NERC-CIP NIS, NIS2 GDPR RED directive EC Cyber Resilience Act (upcoming)

OT environment specific complexity:

- extended solution lifecycle (15-20y) compared with IT systems
- Very distributed environment
- Relationship



Strict requirements for services and products:

- Notification timing for discovered vulnerabilities and incidens
- Product/service 3party certification
- Lifecycle duration for maintenance

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Difficult to comply and be aware to everything expecially for small companies. To overcome this problem is possible :

- adopt collaborative model based on Competence Centers
- enter Information Sharing groups like EE-ISAC



Open source based solutions, responsibilities, and compliance to upcoming regulations.

Information Sharing

References and contacts

- NIST SP 800-161r1, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations, May 2023, <u>https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-161r1.pdf</u>
- NIST CSF v2.0, <u>https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2023/01/19/CSF_2.0_Concept_Paper_01-18-</u> 23.pdf, <u>https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2023/09/journey-nist-cybersecurity-</u> <u>framework-csf-20-workshop-3</u>
- EE-ISAC, European Energy Information Sharing & Analysis Centre: <u>https://www.ee-isac.eu/</u>

Thank You

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