




Leveraging Procurement for Cybersecurity Resilience

Cybersecurity and Digitalization:
Supply Chain Risks in the Electricity Sector

Frank Harrill

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“Contractual requirements should be tough so as to drive the supplier into the mode of continual and rapid improvement.”

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PROCUREMENT LANGUAGE IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

- It is not an effective stand-alone control
- It must be part of a comprehensive supply chain risk control strategy
- It must be understandable to all parties
- It should be as simple as possible... but no simpler
- It should create a flow-down obligation to downstream suppliers


NURTURE TRUSTED SUPPLIER PARTNERSHIPS

- Treat suppliers as true business partners
- Trust but verify
- Establish redundancy whenever possible
- Cultivate lasting supplier relationships

CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT

- Assess suppliers based on risk.
- Visit and review compliance whenever possible.
- Ensure continuity and incident response plans are in place.
- Examine external risk surfaces of suppliers.
 - <https://securityscorecard.com/security-rating/>domain name of supplier
 - <https://webscan.upguard.com/>

MODEL PROCUREMENT LANGUAGE



- Joint effort by the Edison Electric Institute
- Available at: <https://www.eei.org/-/media/Project/EEI/Documents/Issues-and-Policy/Model--Procurement-Contract.pdf>

IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS

- Requests to obtain sensitive supplier documents increase risk without enhancing security.
 - Instead, rely on independently audited third-party certifications or visual inspections.
- Ensure vulnerability disclosure timelines are reasonable and risk-based.
 - The careful balance we all must strike is described in ISO/IEC standard 30111:2019 “Premature disclosure of sensitive vulnerability information can increase the costs and risks associated with disclosure for vendors and users.”

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS COVERAGE

IEC 62443-4-1 Audited Controls

1	Development process	25	Security requirements testing
2	Identification of responsibilities	26	Threat mitigation testing
3	Identification of applicability	27	Vulnerability testing
4	Security expertise	28	Penetration testing
5	Process scoping	29	Independence of testers
6	File integrity	30	Receiving notifications of security-related issues
7	Development environment security	31	Reviewing security-related issues
8	Controls for private keys	32	Assessing security-related issues
9	Security requirements for externally provided components	33	Addressing security-related issues
10	Custom developed components from third-party	34	Disclosing security-related issues
11	Assessing and addressing security-related issues	35	Periodic review of security defect management practice
12	Process verification	36	Security update qualification
13	Continuous improvement	37	Security update documentation
14	Product security context	38	Dependent component or operating system security update documentation
15	Threat model	39	Security update delivery
16	Product security requirements	40	Timely delivery of security patches
17	Product security requirements content	41	Product defense in depth
18	Security requirements review	42	Defense in depth measures expected in the environment
19	Secure design principles	43	Security hardening guidelines
20	Defense in depth design	44	Secure disposal guidelines
21	Security design review	45	Secure operation guidelines
22	Secure design best practices	46	Account management guidelines
23	Security implementation review	47	Documentation review
24	Secure coding standards		

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS COVERAGE

ISO 27001: 2022

- 93 controls, in four categories
 - Organizational Controls (37 controls)
 - People Controls (8 controls)
 - Physical Controls (14 controls)
 - Technological Controls (34 controls)
 - In addition to proper operation of the information security management system including: context of the organization, leadership, planning, support, operation, performance evaluation, and continuous improvement.
- Always review the supplier Statement of Applicability

NATF SUPPLY CHAIN QUESTIONNAIRE

- The North American Transmission Forum (NATF) with cross-industry collaboration created and curates two supply chain risk assessment instruments especially useful when certifications are unavailable:
 - The Criteria
 - The Questionnaire

natf.net/documents

Security and Supply Chain

[NATF Supply Chain Risk Management Guidance](#)

[NATF Supply Chain Security Criteria](#)

[Energy Sector Supply Chain Risk Questionnaire](#)

[NATF CIP-013 Supply Chain Risk Management Plans \(ERO Endorsed\)](#)

[NATF CIP-013 Using Independent Assessments of Vendors \(ERO Endorsed\)](#)

[NATF Industry Collaboration - Using Solution Providers for Third-Party Risk Management](#)

[Cyber Security - Vendor Support via Web Conferencing - Implementation Guidance for CIP-005-6 Parts 2.4 and 2.5](#)

[NATF Implementation Guidance for CIP-010-3 Software Integrity](#)

[Revision Process for the Energy Sector Supply Chain Risk Questionnaire and NATF Supply Chain Security Criteria](#)

[Supply Chain Security Assessment Model](#)

[NATF Practices Document for CIP-014-2 R5](#)

[NATF Practices Document for CIP-014-2 R4](#)

Thank You!

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